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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
CONTINUING JURISDICTION IN ALIMONY SUITS
Pennoyer v. Neff is ninety-five years old and now for
many years legislatures and courts have been attempting to
mitigate its effects. That decision declared a person subject to
a personal money judgment only when he is domiciled in the
state in which suit is filed, is served there, or submits to its
judicial authority. Yet often justice demands that the plain-
tiff be allowed to sue in his own state even though the defen-
dant is not subject to the judicial authority of that state
under the Pennoyer rule. Plaintiffs with commercial and delict-
oriented claims have fared well in the counter movement.
Probably it is for the same reason, permitting the plaintiff to
sue in his state, that the judiciary has developed notions of
"continuing jurisdiction" in alimony cases. One such decision,
Imperial v. Hardy,2 offers evidence of both the urge to give
the alimony plaintiff his suit in his home state and the
difficulty of fitting the objective within the framework of the
Pennoyer lore.
In Imperial a Louisiana wife had obtained personal juris-
diction in Louisiana over her Michigan husband in various
suits to recover alimony arrearages and fix future alimony for
the children of the marriage. Over four years later she filed
motions for summary proceedings, in the same numbered
suit, to fix arrearages and to increase future alimony. Cita-
tion was made by service on the husband's attorney in the
previous litigation, whose previous discharge had not been
made a matter of record. The majority of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court upheld the citations, arguing that the motions
were filed in the same cause and that a defendant may be
cited through his attorney of record in all matters pertaining
to that cause. Two justices dissented, contending essentially
that the two motions constituted new proceedings demanding
that personal jurisdiction be obtained anew over the defen-
dant.
The writer, expressing himself on the interstate judicial
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2. 302 So. 2d 5 (La. 1974).
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jurisdiction issue rather than on whatever may be tolerable
in intrastate suits of the kind, must agree that the motions
constituted new suits. Thus, if it is to be insisted that alimony
suits require personal jurisdiction over the defendant
through domicile or service or submission at the forum, then
the defendant should have been served anew. But the writer
does sympathize with the objectives of the majority. It should
be possible to permit the plaintiff to file suit in his or her
home state and give notice to the defendant in his state of
domicile or wherever he can be found. The solution, at least,
would be more honest, honoring the objective as proper and
avoiding a misuse of other notions in law.3
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE
In Webb v. Webb 4 alimony had been awarded in Florida to
a wife after her Florida husband had obtained a divorce from
her in that state. The husband then had moved to Louisiana
and had ceased paying alimony. The wife sued the husband in
Louisiana for arrearages and the Louisiana court gave her
judgment therefor on the basis of giving full faith and credit
to a money judgment which, under Florida law, remains unal-
terable except by judicial action and then prospectively only.
There can be no doubt the court was very orthodox in its
action, for it followed the 1910 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Sistare v. Sistare.5 It is true, however, that
such judgments as this may be questioned. The husband ar-
gued that he was now a Louisiana citizen, that the wife had
been adjudged at fault in the divorce proceedings, and that
under Louisiana law the husband does not owe alimony to a
wife who has been at fault in the divorce. In the mind of the
writer, the husband's argument was correct. One's alimen-
tary obligation should never exceed that imposed by his own
state's law and one's right to alimony should never exceed
that to which he or she is entitled under his own state's law.6
Alimony is a continuing obligation, to be measured according
to the norms applicable at the time for which it is claimed to
3. See remarks on de Lavergne v. de Lavergne, 244 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971), in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term--Conflict of Laws, ,32 LA. L. REV. 295-98 (1972).
4. 305 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
5. 218 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1910).
6. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Conflict of Laws, 32 LA. L. REV. 295, 297 (1972).
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be due, not by those norms once applicable between the par-
ties at another time when they were citizens of other states.
FILIATION AND FORCED HEIRSHIP
Succession of Goss 7 involved the paternity and forced
heirship rights of a child conceived while both husband and
wife were domiciled in California and born there while the
mother yet was domiciled there. Under the circumstances,
there can be no doubt that the coirt was correct in deciding
that the paternity of the child was to be determined by appli-
cation of California law. All persons were citizens of that
state at all relevant times. Having decided that the husband
of the mother was the father of the child, the court quite
correctly decided that the child would have to be considered a
legitimate child in Louisiana. Although the court did not use
this phraseology, to deny the child legitimate status in
Louisiana would have been to deny full faith and credit to
California's law even though California had legislative juris-
diction to determine the child's paternity and status.
It is to be questioned, however, whether Louisiana was
obliged to consider the child a forced heir of his legitimate
father. The father had died domiciled in Louisiana, leaving a
will disposing of all his assets to other persons. The child,
however, apparently was not domiciled in Louisiana at the
time of his father's death and the writer assumes he was
domiciled in California. If in fact, at the time of the father's
death, the son was domiciled in California or some other place
under whose laws a son is not entitled to a legitime, then the
writer suggests there was no reason to recognize a legitime in
his favor. Why should anyone who chooses to live in a particu-
lar state be deemed entitled to claim any advantage against
another which his own state does not see fit to extend to him?
It may be warranted to assume that one who dies intestate is
presumed to accept the disposition of his assets that his
state's suppletive succession law would make. Thus if the
deceased had died intestate, the non-Louisianian son could
have been heard to claim an intestate inheritance share. But
here the father had died testate, leaving assets to persons
other than his son, making his intention clear. The writer
does not dispute the fact that in the past Louisiana has
applied its forced heirship laws in favor of persons domiciled
7. 304 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
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in places without forced heirship laws, but challenges the
rationality and justice of the practice.
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE CUSTODY
Issue may be taken with the statement in Whatley v.
Whatley8 that a state in which a minor is not present physi-
cally may not entertain a suit between its parents, both pres-
ent before the court, to determine which shall be awarded its
custody. The court considdred the forum state to lack juris-
diction over the person of the minor. On this basis the court
refused to give full faith and credit to an Arkansas custody
judgment, even though the parents were before the court.
The Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, at least, takes the
position that it suffices if the child is domiciled in the state or
present there, or if the parties contending for its custody are
personally before the court." The Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure lists only domicile of the child or its presence in the
state as criteria for judicial jurisdiction over custody. 10 Prob-
ably the Louisiana legislation is too narrow. In any event,
however, the existence of judicial jurisdiction does not settle
the question of legislative jurisdiction, or that of the law to be
applied to determine who shall have custody of the child.
DIVORCE JURISDICTION
In previous Symposia the writer has indicated his opinion
that the United States Supreme Court's opinions, declaring a
divorce judgment not subject to attack for lack of jurisdiction
when the defendant has appeared in the suit, should not be
taken to mean that an appearance of a kind designed to
perpetrate a fraud on the law will suffice. 1 Yet Louisiana
decisions continue to do just that, thus lending cooperation to
those who would evade Louisiana's already much too easy
divorce laws. 12
8. 312 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1969).
10. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 10(5).
11. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-
Conflict of Laws, 33 LA. L. REV. 276, 279 (1973); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Conflict of Laws, 31 LA. L. REV. 312,
314-16 (1971); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967
Term-Persons, 28 LA. L. REV. 312, 322-26 (1968).
12. Babers v. Babers, 312 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
Article 1391 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
inter alia, (1) requires a judge to take judicial notice of the
laws of United States jurisdictions and (2) permits a party to
ask a court to take judicial notice of the law of another juris-
diction, but requires that party to give reasonable notice of
his demand to all adverse parties. In Quickick, Inc. v. Quic-
kick International13 it seems the judge asked both parties to
supply information on the applicable Texas law and both par-
ties complied. The plaintiff, however, contended Texas law
could not be applied inasmuch as the defendant had not given
notice of his intention to rely on it. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal rejected the contention, saying, "We do not believe
the authority of the courts in this respect can be abridged
because of some alleged technical insufficiency in the plead-
ing." 14 The effect of the ruling was correct, for under the full
faith and credit clause no state has any right to refuse to
apply the law of another state having legislative jurisdiction
in the matter. A state statute, no matter how well intended,
cannot be construed to operate to foreclose the application of
the law of another state which is applicable to the case. The
state court has no choice in the matter, but is obliged to give
full faith and credit to the applicable law of another state.
Beyond this, however, it may be noted that article 1391 of the
Code of Civil Procedure probably requires the notice by one
party to the other only when it is one of the parties who
requests judicial notice of another state's law, not when the
court, recognizing its obligation under the full faith and
credit clause, undertakes to do so of its own motion.
13. 304 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 407.
